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Preface 
This paper is part of the ongoing evaluation of the reform in the Norwegian 
employment and welfare administration funded by the Norwegian Research Council. 
The paper is part of the sub-project in this evaluation named Welfare model, governance 
system and NAV (the Norwegian acronym for the employment and welfare-administration), headed 
by Professor Tom Christensen. The paper has been presented at the IPSA Research 
Committee 27 Structure and Organization of Government (SOG) conference: What can 
we learn about the transformation of the state in the age of multi-level governance? 
Paris 23 – 24 May 2008. We want to thank participants at this workshop for comments.  
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Sammendrag 
Dette notatet retter søkelyset mot effekter og implikasjoner av NAV-reformen som er 
en av de største reformer i norsk offentlig forvaltning. Reformen er en sammenslåing av 
A-etat og Rikstrygdeverket i 2005 i en ny arbeids- og velferdsforvaltning med enheter 
både på nasjonalt, regionalt og kommunalt nivå. På lokalt nivå vil det bli etablert NAV-
kontor i hver kommune som skal samarbeide med kommunal forvaltning gjennom en 
partnerskapsmodell når det gjelder sosialhjelp som er et kommunalt ansvar. Vi 
undersøker for det første hvordan reformen så langt har håndtert de tre hovedmålene 
bak reformen, nemlig økt effektivitet, bedre brukerservice og å få personer over fra 
trygd til arbeid. Vi undersøker også mulige sideeffekter ved å beskrive operasjonelle 
effekter, prosess-effekter og system-effekter. For det andre diskuterer vi i hvilken grad 
iverksettingen og effekter av reformen kan forstås fra et instrumentelt, et kulturelt og et 
omgivelses-perspektiv. Notatet viser er at konteksten har stor betydning for resultatene, 
at det så langt er vanskelig å se klare resultater i forhold til reformens hovedmål og at 
det også er noen sidevirkninger av reformen når det gjelder prosess- og systemeffekter. 
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Abstract 
This paper addresses the effects and implications of one of the largest public-sector 
reforms in recent Norwegian administrative history. The reform is a merger of the 
employment and national insurance administrations in 2005 into a new welfare 
administration represented at the central, regional and local levels. At the local level the 
new merged administration will also collaborate with the municipalities through a 
partnership model regarding social services, which is a local government responsibility. 
This is done by establishing joint service offices in all municipalities. We examine first 
how the reform so far has addressed its three main goals, which are bringing people 
from welfare to work, increased user-friendliness and efficiency. We also examine 
possible side-effects by describing operational effects, process effects and system 
effects. Second, we examine to what degree implementation and effects of the reform 
can be understood from an instrumental perspective, a cultural perspective and an 
environmental perspective. A main lesson is that the context is significant for the 
results, that it so far is difficult to se clear results concerning the main goals of the 
reforms and that there also are some side-effects of the reform regarding process and 
system effects. 
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Introduction 
In many countries pressure to increase the capacity and efficiency of governance has led 
to efforts to improve cooperation and coordination between the many different levels 
of government (Halligan 2007). While central government would like to exert more 
control over local activities and services and to standardize them, local government 
would prefer to enhance its autonomy in both a political, and an administrative and 
professional sense. Local administrators would like their activities and services to be 
based in local political and administrative units rather than being an extension of central 
control, policies and preferences. Different countries have chosen different types of 
balance between central control and local autonomy. 
What now seems to be emerging is a new type of hybrid public organization in which 
local autonomy and central control are being enhanced simultaneously through a 
mixture of NPM and post-NPM measures (Christensen, Lie and Lægreid 2007). But the 
challenges of such multi-level governance systems are many. A central issue is whether it 
is really possible to combine different and in some cases incompatible central and local 
concerns and if so, what kind of instruments are required to do this. Another is whether 
professionals with differing backgrounds and on different levels will be able to adopt 
common norms and values, i.e. develop a new hybrid identity. 
This paper addresses the effects and implications of one of the largest public-sector 
reforms in recent Norwegian administrative history. The reform – named the NAV 
reform – is a merger of the employment and national insurance/pension administrations 
into a new employment and welfare administration represented at the central, regional 
and local levels. At the local level the new merged administration will also formally 
collaborate with social services, which have always been administered locally. The NAV 
reform affects around 20,000 public employees in agencies and municipalities. The 
services provided under NAV cost about 30 billion Euros annually and serve about half 
the Norwegian population. Around 700,000 people of working age (of a total 
population of 4.7 million) are either wholly or partially out of work at any given time.  
The aims of the NAV reform are to increase participation in the labor market and to 
make the administration more user-friendly, more holistic and more efficient. The NAV 
reform is the biggest merger of two large sectors ever to take place in Norway. It is 
made more complex by the fact that it introduces a mandatory partnership between 
central and local government in the form of a one-stop-shop system (the local NAV 
service offices).  
A comparison of studies of public organizations in many countries and in particular 
of reform or reorganization processes reveals that reform processes are often 
characterized more by enhanced control of actors than by unambiguous organizational 
thinking and intentions (Christensen and Lægreid 2001, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). 
Often insufficient resources are allocated to acquire information about various possible 
organizational forms, their effects on society and the degree to which they have enabled 
goals to be achieved. A general impression is therefore that effects are assumed, 
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expected or promised but seldom well documented, so that reform practice is often at 
odds with reform rhetoric (Brunsson 1989).  
The empirical focus of this paper is on the challenges, potential effects and tentative 
results of the NAV reform. Our first, descriptive research question is: How has the 
reform so far addressed its three main goals? These are: to get clients off welfare and 
back into work, and to create a more efficient and more service-oriented administrative 
structure. We also ask if the reform has had side effects on other goals and concerns, 
such as quality, democratic values, political control, impartiality, work environment or 
regional development. Our second and explanatory research question is: How does 
context affect the implementation and effects of the reform? To what degree and how 
do environmental, cultural and instrumental/structural context explain the 
implementation and preliminary effects of the reform? How can we determine what is 
the influence of the reform process and what is the influence of the new structural and 
institutional framework?  
As for data, hard evidence is largely lacking, since the decision to implement the 
reform was taken fairly recently. We will concentrate on central respondents’ views and 
their tentative experiences with the reform so far but will also supplement these with 
data from a preliminary study of the local level (Andreassen et al. 2007). The discussion 
of the potential effects of the new structure is based on a number of sources: interviews 
with 43 central actors in the ministries, parliament and central agencies and other 
stakeholders; the findings from earlier studies of comparable reorganizations; and 
analyses of the reform process – its main actors and organizational thinking 
(Christensen 2008), the formal structural changes actually made, the challenges 
identified and some of the first practical effects.  
To address the two research questions we outline a two-fold theoretical basis – on 
the on hand, analytical concepts for the categorization of reform effects, and on the 
other a transformative approach, which examines how instrumental, cultural and 
environmental features combine to produce a dynamic context. We continue by giving a 
brief description of the Norwegian reform context and the NAV reform itself. We then 
describe the implementation process and the perceived effects of the reform, thus 
answering our first research question. Finally, we use the preceding sections to address 
the question of how context affects reform implementation and effects and to draw 
some conclusions and examine some implications. 
Theoretical perspectives 
Measu r i ng  e f f e c t s   
There seems to be an overall tendency in the reform literature to infer too easily from 
intentions and goals to effects (Christensen and Lægreid 2001, Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2004, Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007). The instrumental assumption that the 
actual effects will correspond with the stated goals of political and administrative 
executives must, therefore, be challenged. As has been documented (Christensen 2008), 
the goals of this reform and the means – ends knowledge underlying it are ambiguous; 
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in addition the reform may be modified and changed during the implementation 
process. What is more, it is difficult to isolate the effects of the NAV reform from the 
effects of other reforms taking place at the same time and from the effects of the labor 
market situation and the overall economic climate. Continuing to provide regular 
services to users and clients while at the same time radically reshuffling the whole 
organization is certainly a major challenge. All this makes the effects issue difficult to 
handle (Christensen et al. 2007, chapter 8). We will try to tackle this problem by 
combining a theoretical approach with insights from the reform process and the 
respondents’ experiences and views so far. 
There are many criteria for evaluating the results of reforms, but these tend to be 
conflicting, unclear and unstable. In a political – administrative system like the 
Norwegian one, with a decision-making style traditionally characterized by political 
collaboration and a culture oriented towards consensus, divergent normative and 
political criteria often cause actors to seek compromises. This in turn contributes to 
goals becoming ambiguous and partly conflicting. The situation is further aggravated 
when the country is governed by a coalition or minority government, as was the case 
during the NAV reform process. This is not necessarily a sign of weakness but can be 
interpreted as characteristic of a democratic mode of steering in a pluralistic society. 
Often goals are deliberately unclear even when they are presented as clear in the 
rhetoric, like in some NPM-related processes (Christensen and Lægreid 2003). But it is 
obvious that unclear and partly conflicting goals will make it more difficult to measure 
effects and results. 
There is also the problem of timing. When should effect studies be carried out? If effects 
are measured shortly after an initiative has been launched, the measurements will pertain 
mainly to the first phase of the implementation and adaptation process. As more time 
passes, the probability of revealing lasting effects becomes greater, but so too does the 
difficulty of isolating the effects of a specific organizational reform initiative from other 
reforms and changes that have occurred concurrently or in the meantime. This leads us 
to a methodological problem of effect measurement, namely, the problem of attribution 
(Pollitt 1995). In this paper we will examine the short-term, preliminary effects of the 
NAV reform. The long-term effects will be easier to assess once all the local welfare 
offices have been established in 2010. 
Ca tego r i z i ng  e f f e c t s  and  r e su l t s   
Effects and results are slippery concepts with many different meanings (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004:103). By effects we mean the consequences of organizational reforms, in 
this case the NAV reform. A distinction is often made between a narrow and an 
expanded concept of effects, and we emphasize both empirically. A narrow concept of effects 
focuses on intended or desired effects, or the connection between ideals and practice. In 
this case this would entail examining whether the reform has produced greater efficiency 
and user-friendliness and moved more people off welfare and back into work. Such an 
approach is a key component in an instrumental perspective. Effects are measured 
according to the model’s own preconditions. The question being asked is whether the 
new organization has in reality lived up to the intentions of the reform. Organizational 
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reforms are thus evaluated according to whether they effectively translate given goals 
into decisions, output and outcomes.  
A broad concept of effects will also focus on dysfunctions, side-effects and societal and 
political effects, such as effects on political – democratic steering relations (Christensen 
et al. 2007). The view through this extended effects lens encompasses broader 
instrumental effects, as well as norms, beliefs and opinions related to institutional 
factors. It will therefore also be important to map the relationship between 
organizational forms and the development of meaning, conditions of trust, legitimacy, 
and levels and types of conflict in the new welfare state administration. In situations 
where the extended effects concept is deployed, uncertainty and ambiguity over effects 
grow, and interpreting how public-sector reforms function becomes all the more 
important. 
It is important to distinguish between the effects on main goals and the side-effects 
on other goals that the reform initiatives were not meant to target (Hesse, Hood and 
Peters 2000). It is also important to distinguish whether the effects correspond with 
intentions, are counterproductive, or are neutral, in the sense of being neither positive 
nor negative. The optimal situation would be one where positive effects are achieved for 
the main goals, in a narrow sense, and there are also positive side-effects for other goals, 
but other combinations are more common (Christensen et al. 2007). 
In this paper we use Pollitt and Bouckart’s (2004) classification of effects into three 
categories. The first is operational effects, which include such things as input effects on 
savings, efficiency and productivity; output effects on activity; and outcome effects on 
societal consequences and impacts for users and clients. The second is process effects. 
These include effects on service quality and processing time, on customer and client 
satisfaction, on performance orientation and on responsiveness and user-friendliness, 
but also shift in administrative culture and changes in staff motivation, satisfaction and 
cognitive frames. The third category is system effects. By these we mean effects on the 
capacity of the political – administrative system, such as structural changes in system 
interaction and communication, capacity building, changes in political control, steering 
capacity, coordination, accountability, legitimacy, trust in the system and power 
relations. 
These effects are interconnected. We will not analyse these types of effects in a broad 
manner but certain aspects of them. The three main goals of the reform can be assigned 
to two of the categories: efficiency and getting people from welfare to work are 
operational effects related to input, output and outcome, while user-friendliness is a 
process effect. In addition, side-effects and dysfunctions can also be classified according 
to these categories. While process effects have a more internal focus, system effects 
address how the reform affects the broader political – administrative system. The effects 
of the reform on accountability issues are crucial (Fimreite and Lægreid 2008a). Who 
should be held responsible for poor results and who should be rewarded for good 
results? Do politicians try to take the credit for good results, but pass responsibility for 
bad results on to the organizations that actually carried out the work?  
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Unde r s t and i ng  r e f o rms  
We have so far presented a theoretical framework that makes it possible to categorize 
the effects of the NAV reform. Our intention, however, is not just to describe effects 
but also to explain why these effects take place. For this we need theoretical 
perspectives that help us understand how reforms are implemented and with what 
outcome.  
From a hierarchically-based instrumental perspective one would expect reform behavior and 
results to be influenced by changing organizational forms or structures, as well as by 
demography and physical structure (Egeberg 2003). According to an instrumental 
perspective an ideal presupposes a tight connection between reform visions, goals, 
programs, initiatives, organizational forms, implementation and effects. Effect 
measurement and evaluation may show whether organizational forms and initiatives 
function as planned and point out eventual weaknesses that need to be corrected. A key 
hypothesis is that formal structures influence and channel attitudes and actions (Simon 1957), so 
when the formal structure changes through reforms, the models of thought and actions 
will change accordingly. Moreover, it is assumed that organizations have adequate 
information about the effects of different organizational forms and initiatives. A reform 
is supposed to score high both on political – administrative control and on rational 
calculation (Dahl and Lindblom 1953), meaning that the reform agents have the power 
to implement the reform and are also well informed about means-end relations. The 
challenge is thus to demonstrate how much and in what way these expectations and 
hypotheses are fulfilled, in this case in the NAV reform. Can we identify connections 
between implementation and preliminary results and the new, complex structural 
context?  
Instrumental perspectives hardly see effects and results as problematic, but in 
practice public servants are limited in their ability to learn from experience (Simon 
1957). When it is claimed that organizational structure influences participation, patterns 
of collaboration, attention, conflict relations, balance of power and the ability to 
innovate, it is simultaneously emphasized that results can be uncertain and imprecise. 
Two factors make it particularly difficult to gain full information and insight into results 
and their implications. To begin with, public organizations are clearly limited in their 
capacity and ability to receive, deal with, store and make practical use of information. 
Secondly, in many cases special interests are vested in the information, allowing it to be 
used strategically. 
From a negotiation-based instrumental perspective, one would expect evaluation and effect 
measurement to be used as political ammunition in a power struggle between different 
actors and groups (Cyert and March 1963, March and Olsen 1983). Information is 
seldom neutral. Interests, values and trust relations influence interpretations of what is 
considered important and reliable knowledge. There will therefore be antagonisms and 
conflicts over a public organization’s knowledge-base, particularly if it is heterogeneous 
or finds itself in a heterogeneous environment. Compromises may be worked out, 
making it less clear what to expect of effects but potentially increasing support for a 
reform or reorganization (Mosher 1967). Are there negotiation features in the NAV 
process that clearly influence the implementation and effects of the reform? 
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From a cultural perspective, decisions to introduce new structures or initiatives may 
encounter rejection, resistance or sluggish implementation because they are on a 
collision course with informal norms – understandings and traditions that have long 
dominated an organization (cf. Selznick 1957). Effects will therefore potentially not be 
obtained, and decisions will loosely couple with implementation and results. The reform 
has to pass a compatibility test (Brunsson and Olsen 1993), implying that reform 
elements that are at odds with existing administrative cultures and traditions may easily 
be rejected; and there might also be path-dependencies, making it difficult to leave the 
paths of practices, procedures and organizational structures developed over time 
(Krasner 1988). A partial and pragmatic implementation of reforms may also result from 
cultural resistance. So the question is: What aspects of cultural features or the cultural 
context will influence the implementation and effects of the NAV reforms – and to 
what extent and in what ways? 
An environmental perspective divides the environment of public organizations into two; 
the technical environment and the institutional environment (Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
The technical environment often refers to actors in the environment that an organization 
has close relations with and on whom it is dependent for obtaining resources, for 
decision-making and for the provision of services. Major changes in such relations, or 
any more general kind of crisis in the technical environment, such as an economic crisis, 
may result in reform (Aberbach and Christensen 2001). 
The institutional environment concerns reform trends, myths and fashions in the 
environment that influence internal reforms (Røvik 2002). The emphasis is more on 
using evaluation and result measurement for the purpose of legitimacy, but also in order 
to shape and change people’s attitudes and impressions. The longer the tradition of an 
organizational form, or the longer it has enjoyed hegemony and been accepted as the 
best and most effective form, the less need there will be to examine its effects. If there is 
broad consensus in the environment on the best form of organization, it may be 
unnecessary to examine the effects of alternative organizational forms. Although the 
reforms have apparently been carried out, in reality, decisions and their implementation 
are decoupled from practice and action. In such situations evaluations will often have a 
symbolic function. We will analyze how the technical and institutional environments as 
contextual factors may influence the implementation and results of the NAV reform. 
Before we address the results and effects of the NAV reform more specifically we 
will give a brief outline of the Norwegian reform context and the reform itself. 
The Norwegian reform context and the NAV 
reform 
Norway is a unitary, parliamentary and multi-party state with a small population spread 
over a rather large geographical area. Since the early 1970s, it has been ruled by minority 
governments, but this changed in 2005 when a centre – left majority coalition came to 
power. Collectivist and egalitarian values are important, consensus-orientation is crucial, 
the level of internal conflicts is low, and corporatist arrangements are well developed 
(Christensen 2003). Per capita income is relatively high and there is an abundance of 
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natural resources. The level of labor market participation in Norway is high, including 
among women and elderly people. The unemployment rate is one of the lowest in 
Europe; in February 2008 it was only 1.8 percent.  
Norway has a significant tradition of local self-government. Local authorities with 
their own elected democratic institutions have wide competencies. There are a total of 
431 municipalities with an average population of around 10,000 inhabitants. The 
Norwegian welfare state is one of the most comprehensive and universal in the world, 
with a large public sector. In the Norwegian model welfare policy is decided mainly at 
the central level but adapted to local needs and circumstances and implemented by local 
government. Local government is responsible for social welfare, elementary schools, 
care of the elderly and primary health care and thus constitutes a major part of the 
public sector both in terms of the number of employees and in terms of financial 
resources. National insurance and the labor market administration have, however, 
traditionally been a central government responsibility. The relationship between central 
and local government is a mixture of political decentralization, based on the principle of 
local autonomy, and administrative decentralization, based on the principle of delegated 
authority. Generally specialization by sector is very strong in the Norwegian central 
government administration. The sector ministries have a strong position based on the 
principle of ministerial responsibility. The same sectors have also dominated the 
political and administrative structures at regional and local government levels. 
Political control of the civil service has been general and passive, allowing the 
executive considerable leeway. This seems to reflect high levels of mutual trust and 
shared attitudes and norms among political and administrative leaders, within the public 
sector in general and in the relationship between central and local authorities 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2005, Fimreite et al. 2004). The level of trust in public 
institutions in Norway is generally higher than in most other countries (Norris 1999).  
In Norway administrative reforms at the central level have generally neglected co-
operation across sectors, reflecting strong sectoral administrations. Major reform 
measures have first and foremost been directed at the vertical, sector-based dimension 
of public administration and paid less attention to horizontal coordination problems 
between policy areas and sectors (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). It has been difficult to 
establish cross-ministerial cooperation between policy areas (Christensen and Lægreid 
2007a, Fimreite and Lægreid 2008a).  
 In the Norwegian welfare state, functionally divided sectors present at both the local 
and central level have traditionally been an important mechanism for coordination 
between different levels. The NAV reform is intended to meet the challenges both of 
strong sectors and multi-level governance by formally integrating services that are in 
some cases central government responsibilities (the employment and insurance 
administrations) and in others the responsibility of local government (social services 
administration). In 2005 the Storting merged the administrations of insurance and 
employment at all levels. It also stipulated that the autonomy and tasks of local 
government should not be altered, which implied that the social services administration 
was to remain a local government responsibility. A joint front-line service was to be 
created in each municipality, bringing together the merged employment and insurance 
administrations and the social services administration. The partnership model was 
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introduced as a solution that could help achieve the three main goals of the NAV 
reform without upsetting the balance between local and central government 
responsibilities and autonomy (Fimreite and Lægreid 2008a). 
The introduction of the partnership model was an organizational innovation in the 
Norwegian political – administrative system. It aimed to combine the principle of 
ministerial responsibility and a strong functional specialization on the one hand and the 
principle of local self-government and territorial specialization on the other hand. It was 
promoted as the missing link between local self-government and ministerial 
responsibility. The model was intended to create joint operative solutions with two 
owners, the municipalities and the ministry or government agency. The solutions imply 
dual accountability relationships – upwards within the sector to central government, but 
also to the local government authorities. The model is more specifically based on the 
following principles: 
• The partnership is compulsory by law and mandatory for all municipalities 
• There should be one welfare office in every municipality 
• The welfare office should be a joint front-line service implying co-location of 
the social services administration, the employment administration and the 
insurance administration – the latter two forming the new NAV administration. 
• The welfare office can have either a joint management or a dual management 
arrangement – with one manager from the municipality and one from the 
government. 
• From the municipal side the welfare office should as a minimum include 
financial social assistance. 
There is a trade-off in the partnership arrangements between central government’s need 
for standardization and local government’s need for local adaptation and flexibility. The 
partnership arrangements therefore avoid too much detailed top – down steering and 
allow for local flexibility, thereby making them more legitimate locally. The model was 
characterized by central top civil servants as a ‘sunshine’ or ‘fair weather’ model that 
would work well as long as there was consensus but would run into trouble if there were 
conflicts between the local authorities and government bodies. 
NAV represents a radical departure from the traditional employment and welfare 
administration, but it also represents a complicated form of central – local government 
cooperation and division of responsibility. The formal division of responsibility between 
the central and local authorities has not changed in a fundamental way. Political 
responsibility for the national insurance service as well as for labor-market policy 
remains with central government, while financial social assistance remains a discretion-
based, means-tested benefit under local politicians’ control. Both coordination between 
the different administrations at local level and the one-stop shop idea represent 
challenges for administrations/services and government levels accustomed to territorial 
as well as cultural distance. We now turn to focus on how this new system has been 
implemented and with what preliminary effects.  
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Implementation, experiences and preliminary 
effects 
An  ove r v i ew  o f  t he  imp l emen ta t i on  
As a consequence of the Storting’s approval of the government proposal, an interim 
organization was set up in the fall of 2005 to prepare the formal establishment of the 
new employment and welfare organization (NAV) on July 1 2006. Legislative 
amendments providing for a new employment and welfare administration were 
approved by the Storting in 2006 (St.prp. no 46 (2004 – 2005)). The plan is that the front-
line service units, based on local partnership agreements, will be in place in all 431 
municipalities by 2010; so far (April 2008) about 140 have been established. It is thus 
too early to measure most effects of the reform directly at the local level. Nevertheless, 
we argue that it is of value to discuss the implementation of the reform and some 
preliminary effects, as well as potential effects and implications, both from a scholarly 
point of view, involving the more broad questions of principle, like balancing political 
control and institutional autonomy, but also concerning how the reform may turn out in 
practice. It is important to discuss the intended and expected effects on main goals as 
well as possible unexpected side effects.  
There seems generally to be strong loyalty to the reform, and actors at different levels 
are trying to implement it in line with the reform principles laid down. On the central 
level, the reform created a traditional ministry-agency relationship, although in practice 
the relationship during the first year of the reform has been closer, because the reform is 
a politically highly salient issue. So the ministry has played a more hands-on role than 
usual, particularly concerning the implementation of the reform, but also in ensuring the 
normal provision of services. There are indications now that this is about to change. 
Merging the central parts of the employment and pension administrations seems to have 
run more smoothly than establishing the local welfare offices. One crucial question 
concerning the NAV agency is how the NPM-related 1:3 ratio split between a strategic 
agency – the NAV agency – and a more operational unit, denoted NAV operation and 
development (Norwegian abbreviation NDU) is functioning. NDU can be seen as an 
agency within an agency. Although many supported the model so as to avoid too large a 
central agency, many respondents questioned whether the interface between the two 
units was optimal, especially concerning where to allocate certain tasks and 
responsibilities, such as the development of welfare policies and programs, and whether 
the relationship worked well in practice. The purchaser-provider split is not easy to cope 
with, although long-established personal networks seem to have eased the 
implementation.  
At the local level most offices established so far have unitary management, but there 
are also some with dual management models (Andreassen et al. 2007). Most of the 
managers come from the former employment administration or from the insurance 
service, but there are also some managers who are local government employees. There 
are substantial variations in what tasks the municipalities include in the partnership. 
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Many municipalities have added tasks such as prevention of alcohol- and drug-abuse, 
housing, immigration, debt advice, psychiatric health care and child welfare. Some 
partnerships have also evolved their own specific aims for the local one-stop shops in 
the agreements while others have not. It is obligatory for services included in the 
partnership to be co-located. Some one-stop shops are also co-located with other local 
government services, but most of them are not.  
At the regional level administrative units with special competencies have now been 
established. These units are to handle services defined as individual rights, primarily 
concerning pensions. Establishing such units suggests that some tasks at the local level 
do not naturally belong together and that they do not need to be located at the local 
level, which would reverse the original intention behind the partnerships. It is estimated 
that around 80 percent of all NAV tasks are of that sort. The one-stop shops are 
frontline services where discretionary decisions are to be taken, while the new regional 
administrative units handle more standardized tasks.  
The costs of implementing the reforms are very high. New offices need to be built in 
431 municipalities and one-third of the NAV staff of about 20,000 employees will have 
to move to another work place or change their tasks. In 2007 alone the government 
spent approximately 150 million Euros on implementing the reform. Thus the 
transaction costs and the administrative costs of the reform are huge.  
Ope ra t i ona l  e f f e c t s  
The reform agents hope for an efficiency gain brought about by the economy-of-scale 
effects of the main merger of sector organizations and by the specialization and 
streamlining of tasks. But the goal of increased cost-efficiency seems so far to have 
received less attention than the other two main goals. This probably reflects the 
Norwegian tradition of weak focus on redundancies when major public reforms are 
implemented, a principle that was also adhered to in this reform. Rationalization of 
human resources is an aspect of NPM ideology that is contested in Norway. The 
ministry decided in 2005 that (1) no one employed in the labor or pensions 
administration prior to 2006 should lose their job as a result of the NAV reform, (2) 
there should be a one-stop NAV office in each municipality and (3) that each office 
should have at least three employees. Regional policy has always been important in 
Norway, and specifying the exact number of employees at each local office must be seen 
as part of this policy.  
The establishment of new administrative units for pensions and other specialized 
back-office tasks was partly based on efficiency arguments. Some respondents claim 
these units have realized efficiency gains already, while others say they have so far 
devoted more attention to moving personnel, merging cultures and developing services 
than to increasing efficiency. 
In addition the problem of ambiguous responsibility lines, a lack of unified steering 
relations, unclear interfaces between agencies and organizations at different levels, and a 
generally rather complicated administrative model may mean that efficiency gains are 
less spectacular than those expected or promised by the reform agents. Another 
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precondition for increased efficiency is suitable ICT solutions, and there seems to be a 
long way to go and a lot of money to be invested before this is achieved.  
Regarding the second goal of the reform – getting people off welfare and into work – 
it is also difficult to identify any clear effects as yet. An important aim of the NAV 
reform is to bring people into the workforce who are in marginal employment situations 
but who have a realistic possibility of getting a job if they get adequate support from 
NAV. If NAV is not able to make a difference for such groups, the reform has been a 
failure according to a central respondent. There is a strong expectation that NAV 
should be able to bring some of the 350,000 on disability benefits and the 40,000 
unemployed back to work. Given that Norway is currently experiencing an economic 
boom with very low unemployment, the conditions are optimal for achieving this goal. 
What is more, the country actually has a labor shortage in some sectors, so bringing 
more people into the workforce is highly desirable. This must also to be taken into 
consideration when effects are evaluated. Without a booming economy and a low 
unemployment rate it would probably have been difficult to implement the NAV 
reform at all. So if one wishes to study effects of the NAV reform, there is an obvious 
attribution problem. It is very difficult to distinguish the effect of the NAV reform on 
an aggregate level from the effect of the present situation on the labor market and of the 
general economic boom. Another problem is that not all users of NAV are to be 
brought back into the labor market. Pensioners and some people on social welfare will 
never return to work, so these groups must be excluded before effects can be measured. 
If we take a closer look at the two goals in question here – achieving more efficiency 
through a renewed organization and at the same time getting people back to work – 
several of our respondents in the NAV agency complain that the political pressure to 
establish the expected number of NAV offices and specialized regional units has had a 
negative effect on services and has thus hampered the goal of getting people back to 
work. 
P ro ce s s  e f f e c t s  
As in many reforms, in the NAV reform too there are loose assumptions about the 
connection between the chosen solution (here the merger and relocation) and the 
effects on services and users (Christensen 2008). One major question is whether the 
reorganization is overly geared to coping with the 15 percent who are multi-service 
users. While these users are indeed likely to be better off with a coordinated structure, 
the outcome of the merger for the remaining 85 percent who normally use only one of 
the original services may actually be negative or at least somewhat more challenging. For 
these users the merger may create more complexity and confusion and hence a 
potentially poorer service. Thus, the new administration is likely to have a highly 
differentiated internal structure or it may even engage in new reorganizations, as seen 
with the new regional pension units. One can of course hope for «smart practice» and 
seamless internal collaboration, but there is obviously a concern that operations may not 
run as smoothly as that (Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007). 
A key indicator of fulfilment of the goal of increased user-friendliness is how well the 
newly established local one-stop shops function. So far there has been no significant 
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change in customer satisfaction, as shown in a study of the first 25 local welfare offices 
(Alm Andreassen et al. 2007). Generally our respondents at the central level thought the 
new organization was more user-friendly. There have, however, been some critical 
media reports concerning the user-friendliness of the reform. This is partly a structural 
challenge, because the newly merged employment and insurance services will have one 
set of formal structures, law, rules, tasks and personnel (eventually two when 
implementing the reform), while the locally based social services will have a different 
one. Some central challenges are developing control measures and incentives to further 
local collaboration between the two forms of services, establishing participation 
channels for users locally, and balancing the simplified procedure for applying for 
services and assistance against the actual results of these applications.  
One really big challenge of the reform is to make the ICT systems of the three 
administrations compatible. So far it has proved very difficult to merge these systems 
into an integrated and standardized joint system. The problems of streamlining the ICT 
systems can affect both the efficiency goal and the user-friendliness of the reform.  
A further process-related issue is the establishment of the new regional 
administrative units for pensions and other specialized tasks. This might be seen as a re-
specialization in the sense that process is being introduced as a specialization principle 
in addition to geography and sector or tasks (Fimreite and Lægreid 2008b). The idea is 
that these regional units will process cases in a more just, consistent and standardized 
way than the local NAV offices would. The regional specialized units also have a role in 
the realization of the user-friendliness goal, for it is crucial that the interface between 
NAV offices and the regional back-office units works smoothly. If transactions between 
these levels are slow, users will experience annoying delays in case processing and the 
NAV reform will be perceived to have worsened user-friendliness. 
One further process-related challenge mentioned by many actors in this process is 
the cultural one. How easy is it to merge a judicial culture (insurance and pensions) 
designed to deal with individual cases in a routine, rule-based way with a modernized 
employment culture embracing a broader range of social science competencies and 
more complex problems, and then to expect it to cooperate with a local social services 
culture based on local knowledge and a client-oriented discretionary approach? 
Employees from the three different mother organizations belong to different welfare 
professions and they have different opinions about which problems are relevant and 
which solutions are appropriate. This may cause problems of trust between employees 
at the local offices.  
To develop a new NAV identity as a process of institutionalization will, however, 
take time and so far there are only weak indications that this is happening. Training is an 
issue here. Both the government proposal and the Storting’s decision envisage local 
training of managers and the development of local professional competence and culture 
as part of a more systematic human resources management strategy. But the issue of 
competence is still a big challenge that seems to have received relatively little attention in 
the implementation process. A separate NAV education or training system has not been 
planned, although competence is stressed as an important factor. Competence in some 
units seems to be fragmented and fragile, and there is a need for more common 
methodologies, working methods and ways of thinking. The idea is that much of this 
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can be achieved through on-the-job training. Another problem is that respect for the 
municipalities and the competence they offer has hitherto been rather weak. However, if 
the process of creating a homogeneous structural and cultural service is successful this 
picture may change. 
In addition to this challenge, the motivation of the staff may be affected by the 
reform process itself. As mentioned above, no one needs to fear losing their job, but 
staff may be given different tasks or relocated. This can be stressful and reduce 
motivation. A further complication concerns those who were employed in the national 
insurance administration. Some respondents claim that some of these staff feel that the 
reform’s focus on getting people back to work has made this a central issue in the local 
NAV offices and that their own skills and experience have been devalued as a result. 
For this reason many, but not all, former national insurance employees have moved to 
regional back-office units.  
To sum up, the expected process effects of the NAV reform are better adjusted 
services for multi-service users and a distinct NAV competence and culture. These 
effects may, however, be accompanied by other undesirable side-effects: The strong 
focus on multi-service users, for instance, may make the system more complicated for 
single-service users. Different ICT systems, or rather the lack of one integrated ICT 
system, may affect the process negatively, as may the identities, cultures and 
competencies from each of the merged or collaborating administrations if these are not 
integrated. 
Sys t em  e f f e c t s  
One especially strong concern is that the local partnerships in practice will not be 
between equal partners and that the representatives from the former employment and 
insurance administrations will act as «big brother» in their new and strong central agency 
role. It is hard to fulfil the ambition of creating partnerships where the partners are truly 
equal, even though most of the respondents on the central level emphasize that they 
wish to do so. But respondents at the local level are still afraid that the merged 
government services will dominate the local partnerships.  
 One reason for this is that top – down steering has been pretty strong. Respondents 
report that the central agency has been too dominant and that this has reduced local 
autonomy and self-governance. Experience so far has shown that it is difficult to 
establish holistic, integrated and seamless services based on partnerships at the local 
level (Nyhus and Thorsen 2007), since the dual hierarchies are still very much present. A 
study of the first 25 pilot offices indicates that the partnership model is perceived as 
challenging from the local level. Achieving a delicate balance between top – down 
steering, demands, negotiations, dialogue and mutual cooperation both with the 
municipalities and with external bodies is tricky.  
The first results from the evaluation also reveal that among central civil servants 
there is a strong wish for more standardization in relations with local offices. Many 
respondents report that aspects of the partnership model are an obstacle to efficient 
implementation of the NAV reform. To handle the tension between different levels, a 
partnership forum has been established at the local level. In this forum the municipality 
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is represented by the administrative executive manager (in some cases the mayor). The 
central government side is represented by the county NAV manager. The forum is 
intended to be a kind of board for the local partnership.  
Even though this forum may imply a situation where both partners are equal, the fact 
is that the partnership has to operate in a situation where the central government and 
the municipalities have different budget systems, co-determination systems, working 
conditions, wage agreements and personnel management systems, and where they work 
according to different laws and rules, even though strong efforts have been undertaken 
to make them more equal, standardized and compatible. This situation has produced 
management problems as well as conflicts and tensions both between the different labor 
unions and between civil service unions and government employers. Opinions differ 
over whether the power of the unions has been weakened or not, depending on the 
responses from different actors with different points of departure. 
One question to be raised is whether this new administrative apparatus is likely to 
increase political control over the administrations and services involved, or whether it 
will instead increase institutional and professional autonomy. The preconditions for 
more central political control are certainly there. First, the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Inclusion has overall responsibility for the services involved, which means that co-
ordination is easier than if the services had been divided among several ministries. 
Second, the two merged administrations are centrally based, while the social services are 
locally based, which would potentially give the central apparatus the upper hand, 
particularly if the NAV agency is closely controlled or monitored by the ministry, as 
indicated by many respondents. Third, the services being merged will, as shown, have 
different structures, professions and cultures to cope with, which does not point in the 
direction of increased institutional and professional autonomy. But if local cooperation 
and standardization eventually emerge this will certainly act as a counterweight to central 
control. 
The NAV reform is in many ways built on post-NPM views of coordination and 
collaboration (Christensen, Lie and Lægreid 2007). Vertical coordination, meaning how 
central government should secure control over the new services and standardize them, 
is important and is based on a balance between; a) central political control, indicating a 
traditional, centralized structure, b) production, suggesting more devolution-oriented 
solutions and c) rights, for example making greater use of independent appeal bodies. 
When it comes to vertical accountability the relationship between the ministry and the 
central NAV agency is of great importance. The organizational solution apparently 
envisaged here is a more traditional ministry-agency relationship, where there is a 
balance between control and autonomy. The ministry should control the agency at arm’s 
length according to the NPM principle of using rules and regulations to steer indirectly 
and at a distance. In practice, however, it proved difficult to live up to this principle of 
autonomous agencies. In addition there is the internal vertical coordination inside the 
NAV agency and the inter-governmental coordination between the central agency and 
the regional and local parts of the apparatus.  
In the 2007 state budget NAV was allocated about 30 billion euros, which is close to 
one third of the entire budget. The ministry has not only been involved in strategic 
issues, but also in individual cases and small issues, so there has been much more 
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control over detail than originally planned. There are many different tools and channels, 
both formal and informal, for steering and control, and there are a lot of steering signals 
of both a general and a more specific nature. Not only the ministry, but also the Storting 
and the National Audit Office are developing control routines and practices regarding 
NAV, such as performance auditing. It is still too early to early to know how these 
conditions will affect NAV, but we expect that the intention of ‘more steering in big 
issues and less steering in small issues, and using rules and regulations to engage in more 
indirect steering, will be difficult to fulfill. It should, of course, also be mentioned that 
the NAV central agency has important resources and competencies that may help to 
secure its autonomy. 
Horizontal coordination at different levels also has an impact on administrative 
accountability. The horizontal intra-ministerial coordination between the new NAV 
agency and other areas of the ministry is no exception to this; neither is the inter-
ministerial coordination between the employment and welfare administrations on the 
one hand and other related policy areas, such as education and health on the other. 
Added to this, there are also concerns about vertical coordination involving the 
mechanisms the ministry has to influence social services locally in the tension between 
sector-based and territorial specialization. The advantage here is that all the relevant 
areas now come under the ministry, potentially furthering coordination. The 
disadvantage is that the Ministry of Labor and Social Inclusion is huge, and the political 
leadership may have capacity problems. Whether the different levels of the NAV agency 
will manage to coordinate employment and insurance services as planned is also an 
important question, as is local coordination of the social services inside the one-stop 
shops. At the very local level coordination with locally elected political and 
administrative executives is also a challenge (Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007). 
Local leaders may try to allocate a lot of local tasks to local welfare offices in order to 
save resources, or else they may try to restrict local participation in the offices in order 
to preserve their autonomy. 
There are also internal challenges in the NAV agency concerning steering and 
control. A main idea was to have a rather small and strategic central agency and to 
establish a large, internal, semi-autonomous operating and development unit with 
special responsibility for ICT issues (NDU) that would be run according to an NPM-
inspired purchaser-provider model as a kind of «agency within an agency». This 
development from a cooperation model to a purchaser model has, however, been rather 
difficult to implement and there have been management problems and unclear 
responsibility relations at the interface between the central NAV agency and its own 
semi-independent sub-agency, producing some frustration in the NDU. There are 
problems of influence and ambiguous interfaces and responsibility relations between the 
NDU and the NAV agency. 
Accountability is a central concern in a political – administrative structure based on a 
representative democracy A central question is therefore whether the NAV reform will 
make accountability unambiguous and transparent or whether it will instead produce an 
«accountability deficit» (Baldwin et al. 1988, Christensen and Lægreid 2006). 
Accountability is a central concern and a key question in the partnership model. How 
can one have joint action, common standards and shared systems, on the one hand, and 
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vertical accountability for individual agency performance on the other. The partnership 
model tends not to clarify lines of accountability. The challenge is to achieve a better 
balance between vertical accountability to the central level, accountability to local 
authorities, and responsiveness to users (Christensen and Lægreid 2007b). A substantial 
dilemma is how to enhance vertical accountability and control within the welfare state 
administration at the same time as sustaining the autonomy of local government in this 
policy area. 
The main intended system effect of the NAV reform is a well functioning 
partnership between central and local government in service provision. This can, 
however, be challenged by side-effects: The degree of equality between the partners is 
one challenge here. The division of labor between the administrative levels in the future 
is another, and a third is the problem of coordination in an organizational structure as 
complex as the partnership model. Added to this one can also expect system effects – 
and therefore also side-effects – connected to accountability. Not only administrative 
and legal accountability are at stake in the partnership model but also political 
responsibility for some of the welfare state’s most important services. 
Discussion 
After describing some main effects using our theoretical distinctions, we will explore the 
second research question – namely, how the different environmental, cultural and 
structural contexts help to explain implementation and thereby the preliminary effects. 
The NAV reform can first be explained in terms of an instrumental perspective, in which 
we look at the structural context of reform. Early in the process, there was a distinct and 
almost unanimous request from the Storting to merge the employment, 
insurance/pensions and social service administrations (Christensen 2008). There seemed 
to be a rather clear feeling that such a merger would produce a more efficient, holistic 
and user-friendly welfare administration and that as a result more people would be 
brought into the workforce. The Storting perceived a close connection between means 
and ends and it was therefore expected that operational, process and system effects 
would be the ones that were intended. In fact, however, the Storting did not have a very 
clear idea of how to obtain some of the expected effects and its organizational thinking 
was general and rather loose. For several years the government resisted such a solution 
and eventually came up with a compromise that was a kind of partial merger, i.e., 
merging the employment and pensions administrations and establishing a local, 
mandatory partnership with the locally based social services. This compromise made the 
structural solution even more complicated. 
If we look at the NAV reform structure at the central level, what speaks in favor of 
the new structural context delivering on the three main goals of the reform? First, there 
may be efficiency gains in the central merger of the two sector administrations, 
potentially yielding a more streamlined and more smoothly run welfare administration 
apparatus. In addition, the ministerial mergers of 2003 and 2005 eventually established 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Inclusion as the body holding central political 
responsibility for all the three sectoral administrations involved. It is too early to tell 
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whether these structural pre-conditions will increase efficiency in practice, and this also 
depends on coupling the reform with work at the lower level. The simple fact that 
nobody has lost their job as a result of the reform will certainly modify these potential 
effects, particularly efficiency gains. 
The second question is how the central organization of the reform will create more 
jobs or get people receiving pensions or welfare benefits into the workforce. One can 
argue that the mergers at the ministerial and agency level will create more homogeneity, 
capacity and direction as a precondition for more concerted efforts. The real test of this 
would have been if Norway were in a rather bleak economic period with high 
unemployment, but the opposite is the case, smoothing the reform at this point. It is 
therefore difficult to draw any conclusions about the structural effects on employment. 
Third, it is even more difficult to see how central structural changes will increase user-
friendliness. The only argument might be that the central merger is a precondition for 
local coordination, and that the reform has caused the central level to focus on local 
partnerships and one-stop shops. 
For most actors the crucial test of the reform will be how the new local partnership 
model works. The actual local organizational framing of the reform can primarily be 
seen as the result of negotiations between central and local government. These 
negotiations in themselves were rather instrumental, but in the compromise solution the 
connection between means and ends has become rather blurred. One consequence is 
that the local structure is rather complex, and the effects must be judged according to a 
combination of standardization (mandatory partnership and physically organized 
together) and variety (concerning leadership model and local tasks that may be 
included).  
So in what ways can this new complex local structure potentially deliver on the main 
goals of the reform? One might expect efficiency to improve as a result of economies of 
scale and by bringing experts together at one location, so that more cases can be 
processed using the same resources, but an analysis of whether this is actually the case 
has yet to surface. As already mentioned, efficiency gains may be hindered by keeping all 
the employees. More collaboration between the different services may benefit multi-
service users and may result in more people returning to work, but this must be weighed 
up against a possible increase in complexity for one-service users. As experience with 
one-stop shops in other countries seems to indicate (Halligan 2004), coordinated 
services could definitely increase user-friendliness, but this could be counteracted by 
increased local complexity. In addition user-friendliness becomes irrelevant if the 
content of the service is poorer. 
One important side-effect of the reform is what effect it has on political control. 
Hence a main challenge of the new structure is to find a balance between central control 
and local autonomy. Overall the new structure seems to further dominance by the 
center, owing to the ministerial and agency merger, and it seems to create an asymmetry 
in the relationship, even though central respondents emphasize that their goal is to 
achieve balance and a partnership between equals. Using a catch-phrase from old 
imperialist theory one could say that there is a strong probability that ‘the center will 
penetrate the periphery through the center in the periphery’ – the local welfare offices. 
The results from the pilot study and the views of our respondents seem, however, to 
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indicate a mixture of satisfaction and tensions, thus confirming the old wisdom that 
changes in organizational structure always have dual effects (Gulick 1937). Employees 
are apparently satisfied with the new structure because the increased collaboration it 
offers goes some way towards resolving the former problem of fragmentation, and this 
applies to users as well. The central respondents thought the local solution functioned 
relatively well, but, like the local employees, they also saw the presence of a strong 
consolidated central agency and its resources at the regional level as a challenge, because 
it posed a threat to local autonomy and raised issues of local compatibility and 
standardization concerning wages, working conditions, personnel policy, etc. 
It is not uncommon to modify or change a structural solution chosen in public 
reforms during the implementation process. This applies to the NAV reform too 
concerning the establishment of regional administrative units related to pensions, which 
involved moving personnel up from the local level. The effects of this structural change 
seem to be two-fold. On the one hand, it undermines local resources and makes 
especially small local welfare offices more vulnerable. On the other hand, the user-
related work locally, particularly the discretionary part, becomes somewhat clearer by 
giving more attention to multi-service users.  
There are also obvious some negotiation features of the effects and implications. 
Compromises in the goal formulation phases tend to produce ambiguities and new 
bargaining in the implementation process and thus making it less clear what to expect of 
effects. The establishment of local partnership arrangements challenges the 
preconditions of equal partners and tends to favour the more powerful governmental 
actors. There are also tensions between different central governmental actors and 
interests such as professions and civil service unions and government employers. 
The cultural perspective also provides insight into the tentative consequences of the 
reforms, also in a dynamic relationship to the structural elements. Merging or increasing 
collaboration between different administrative and professional cultures is always a 
challenge, and the NAV reform is no exception. There are indications that this process 
is running more smoothly at the central level than at the local level. While the local 
attitude to collaboration is one of good will, collaboration is hampered by the different 
legal, wage and personnel traditions as well as by different professional cultures. It is no 
easy task to merge these cultures and create a new professional identity, while at the 
same time implementing a demanding reform. These challenges seem to be easier to 
deal with at the central level, partly because there are only two cultures merging, but also 
because the activities are more general and strategic and less operational. 
So what are the implications of these features for the main goals of the reform? 
Concerning efficiency, one could say that real local collaboration between professionals 
is a major precondition. If the three former administrative units, with their different 
cultural traditions, continue to follow their structural and cultural paths, this is likely to 
result in complexity, conflicts and inefficiency. The goal of getting more people into the 
workforce must also be closely tied to cultural co-evolution and collaboration, 
particularly with regard to multi-service users. Achievement of the goal of increased 
user-friendliness must be judged according to how clients see the one-stop shop. While 
a seamless service resulting from the gradual development of a common culture might 
be an advantage, people whose needs are simple and who only need to use one service 
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may not be particularly happy about ‘their administration’ being absorbed into a more 
common NAV culture. 
Concerning the environmental perspective and the technical environment, one of the 
goals of the reforms – more people entering the workforce – is clearly made much 
easier to achieve by a favorable labor market and the very low unemployment rate in 
Norway. Although many respondents think that the reform is instrumental in this 
respect, they admit that this is rather difficult to prove. The reform is also dependent on 
a good relationship and collaboration between many actors and institutions, e.g., with 
other sectors like health, and between employers and unions, if the main goals are to be 
fulfilled. One could say that if pressure from the technical environment had been 
stronger, the reform might have run into much more trouble in seeking to achieve this 
goal. 
One could also say that, in terms of achieving a balance between political control and 
institutional autonomy, the reform is very much characterized by technical external 
pressure, whether from the Storting or from the political leadership. Since it was the 
Storting that originally initiated the reform, it has obviously been following it very 
closely and is concerned both with achieving the main goals and with the resources used 
to do this. As described, the political executive is also following both the 
implementation of the reform and the daily work of the new organization pretty closely, 
making the technical pressure strong. 
The institutional environment is also of relevance for the effects of the reforms. 
During the process two main concepts – ‘one administration’ and ‘partnership’ – 
acquired a symbolic status. Both these concepts were somewhat ambiguous, particularly 
the first one, but both helped to make the reform possible and politically acceptable. 
The concept of partnership stood very strongly for a more holistic and better 
coordinated organization. During the implementation of the reform these concepts 
retained their symbolic value but they also became more problematic when put to the 
test in reality. This applies particularly to the concept of partnership, which implies a 
balance between two equal partners, whereas in reality this has proved difficult to 
achieve in a situation where the central ministry and the NAV agency seem to have the 
upper hand. 
Conclusion 
There are no simple recipes or one optimal organizational solution for achieving a 
better-organized welfare state administration. One important reason for this is that the 
context is significant for the results. The new welfare state administration represents a wide 
spectrum of functions, tasks and target groups, and it operates in different 
administrative structures and cultures and under different external conditions and 
circumstances. In each case the mix of goals and values is different. It is, therefore, very 
unlikely that one single set of organizational forms or management models will work 
everywhere, at all times and in all situations. One reason for this is that the contexts and 
environments of public organizations differ. This is partly taken account of in 
differentiated local solutions, which allow for a wide variety of experiences. The overall 
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complexity in structure and culture we see in the NAV reform is partly due to the 
reform process, which resulted in a compromise, but it also represents an attempt to 
take account of differences in tasks and client groups.  
Clearly the context of the welfare state administration is important for its mode of 
operation and for achieving results. The three perspectives we have followed emphasize 
the significance of context in different ways. An instrumental perspective underscores 
the significance of political and administrative signals for steering and conscious 
structural design. A cultural perspective directs attention to the influence of 
organizational traditions and professional and organizational cultures on the internal 
context, while an environmental perspective underscores the significance of the external 
technical environment and of the institutional environment in which organizations 
function. The problem is that the influence of these contextual factors is general rather 
than specific, which gives few directional lines for concrete action in specific cases. We 
also warn against excessive optimism as regards learning, although there is robust 
knowledge about the effects of certain structural solutions for public organizations 
(Egeberg 2003).  
Unambiguous cause-effect relations are certainly seldom in social science. There are 
no controllable experiments where one can straightforwardly read off objective results. 
Rather than assuming that political and administrative leaders will act in accord with a 
planning ideal, we should ask questions about how a leadership functions in situations 
where it lacks the time and capacity to give full attention, where goals are unclear and 
where there is doubt about the best means of achieving them as well as about what the 
outcome will be. Politicians do not always need clear goals but rather models of steering 
that can be deployed when goals are unclear. This raises the question of whether there is 
a need for goal-free evaluation, where performance evaluation is not limited to one pre-
determined goal but also takes into consideration consequences for other areas and 
other goals. Often one learns how the world looks from the standpoint of a given policy 
model, but if the underlying model is wrong the learning will be futile. We must learn 
not only whether the organizational form functions in accord with the underlying 
model, but also whether the model itself is founded on faulty or sound assumptions.  
If we, from an instrumental vantage point, define effects narrowly – for instance 
scientifically tested effects of the final results of administrative reforms – the public-
sector reforms that have taken place over the past decade would not have needed results 
in order to energize continuing reform efforts. This is no surprise from a symbolic point 
of view, for it emphasizes the myths and rhetorical aspects of reform. Perhaps the most 
important effects of reform work have been the changes in the way we speak about 
public organizations, which indicates a cultural shift in our understanding of what public 
organizations are and how we expect them to function.  
Measuring effects is an important but difficult activity that indicates a desired 
direction for development. Used with wisdom, and keeping in mind the limitations and 
conditions, effect studies could make an important contribution to finding out more 
about how public organizations function. Although a difficult and challenging activity, 
this does not mean one should stop studying effects and results. Firstly, if evaluations 
were not carried out, how would it be possible to find out whether public organizations 
and initiatives are functioning? Secondly, it is naive to suppose that evaluations provide 
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final answers that are immediately implemented by eager politicians and administrative 
leaders. Many other factors besides administrative reforms will also influence how 
public organizations and initiatives are evaluated, interpreted and changed. Thirdly, 
evaluation and measuring results can be difficult, but this does not mean they are not 
worth trying. 
The Norwegian consensus-oriented style of decision-making means that there is a 
strong wish to come up with compromises that everyone can accept. This entails 
building some ambiguity into the solutions chosen, so there is flexibility and leeway for 
different interpretations – in this case of the new model of the welfare state 
administration, and more specifically the partnership solution envisaged by the NAV 
reform. In this case the solution represented something new that has the potential to 
change certain fundamental principles of the Norwegian constitution. These are the 
principle of independent local self government and the principle of ministerial 
responsibility, both of which are strong and hard to challenge. The partnership model 
introduced by the reform as an intermediate organizational form combining these 
principles was thus an innovation. This was made possible by the ambiguity and the 
symbolic character of the new model, and it is an empirical question how it will be 
specified and practiced. 
Coming back to the main research questions, we can conclude that context, whether 
instrumental, cultural or environmental, is significant for the results shown related to the 
reform. It’s too early and overall difficult to conclude, based on the preliminary effects, 
whether the reform has fulfilled the main goals of the reform, even though it’s indicated 
that there is more of a potential in getting more people into the workforce, particularly 
the multi-service clients, and to increase user-friendliness, than it is to see efficiency 
gains. It’s also indicated that on one important side-effect, the balance of central control 
and local autonomy, there seems to be centralizing elements so far. 
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22‐2004  Birte Folgerø  Johannessen: «Ledelse og evidens  i det psykiske helsevernet, konsekvenser  for 
kunnskapsforståelse og organisering». Desember 2004. 
23‐2004  Jacob Aars og Svein Kvalvåg: «Politiske uttrykksformer i en bykontekst». Desember 2004. 
24‐2004  Ingrid Helgøy: «Active Ageing in the Labour Market. Country Report − Norway». December 
2004. 
25‐2004  Torgeir Sveri: «Strukturer og reformer. En kvalitativ analyse av reformen  ’Enhetlig  ledelse’ 
sett i lys av sykehusets arbeidsorganisering». Desember 2004. 
26‐2004  Stig Helleren: «Arbeidstilsynets rollekonflikt: Vekslende tilsynsstrategier mellom kontroll og 
veiledning». Desember 2004. 
27‐2004  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Frode  Meland  and  Odd  Rune  Straume:  «Globalisation  and  Union 
Opposition to Technological Change». December 2004. 
28‐2004  Frode  Meland:  «A  Union  Bashing  Model  of  Inflation  Targeting».  December  2004.  The 
Globalization Program. 
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2003 
1‐2003  Tom Christensen og Per Lægreid: «Politisk styring og privatisering: holdninger i elitene og 
befolkningen». Mars 2003. 
2‐2003  Ivar Bleiklie, Per Lægreid and Marjoleine H. Wik: «Changing Government Control in Norway: 
High Civil Service, Universities and Prisons». March 2003. 
3‐2003  Badi H. Baltagi, Espen Bratberg and Tor Helge Holmås: «A Panel Data Study of Physiciansʹ 
Labor Supply: The Case of Norway». March 2003. HEB. 
4‐2003  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Frode  Meland  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «Unionised  Oligopoly,  Trade 
Liberalisation and Location Choice». March 2003. The Globalization Program. 
5‐2003  Lise Hellebø: «Nordic Alcohol Policy and Globalization as a Changing Force». April 2003. 
6‐2003  Kim Ove Hommen: «Tilsynsroller i samferdselssektoren». April 2003. 
7‐2003  Tom  Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Trust  in  Government  –  the  Significance  of  Attitudes 
Towards Democracy, the Public Sector and Public Sector Reforms». April 2003. 
8‐2003  Rune Ervik: «Global Normative Standards and National Solutions for Pension Provision: The 
World Bank, ILO, Norway and South Africa  in Comparative Perspective». April 2003. The 
Globalization Program. 
9‐2003  Nanna Kildal: «The Welfare State: Three Normative Tensions». Mai 2003. 
10‐2003  Simon Neby: «Politisk styring og institusjonell autonomi – tre illustrasjoner». Mai 2003. 
11‐2003  Nina  Berven:  «Cross  National  Comparison  and  National  Contexts:  Is  what  we  Compare 
Comparable?». July 2003. The Globalization Program. 
12‐2003  Hilde  Hatleskog  Zeiner:  «Kontrollhensyn  og  kontrollpraksis.  En  studie  av  Food  and 
Veterinary Office (FVO)». August 2003. 
13‐2003 Nanna Kildal: «Perspectives on Policy Transfer». August 2003. 
14‐2003 Erik Allardt: «Two Lectures: Stein Rokkan and the Twentieth Century Social Science». «Den 
sociala rapporteringens tidstypiska förankring». September 2003. 
15‐2003  Ilcheong  Yi:  «The  National  Patterns  of  Unemployment  Policies  in  Two  Asian  Countries: 
Malaysia and South Korea». September 2003. The Globalization Program. 
16‐2003 Dag Arne Christensen: «Active Ageing: Country Report Norway». November 2003. 
17‐2003 Kim Ove Hommen: «Tilsynspolitikk i Norge: Utflytting og autonomi». November 2003. 
18‐2003  Dag Arne Christensen, Rune Ervik and Ingrid Helgøy: «The Impact of Institutional Legacies on 
Active Ageing Policies: Norway and UK as Contrasting Cases». December 2003. 
19‐2003  Ole  Frithjof Norheim  og  Benedicte  Carlsen:  «Legens  doble  rolle  som  advokat  og  portvakt  i 
Fastlegeordningen. Evaluering av fastlegeordningen». Desember 2003. HEB 
20‐2003  Kurt R. Brekke og Odd Rune Straume: «Pris‐ og avanseregulering  i  legemiddelmarkedet. En 
prinsipiell diskusjon og en vurdering av den norske modellen». Desember 2003. HEB 
21‐2003  Per Lægreid, Vidar W. Rolland, Paul G. Roness and John‐Erik Ågotnes: «The Structural Anatomy 
of the Norwegian State 1947‒2003». December 2003. 
22‐2003  Ivar  Bleiklie, Haldor  Byrkjeflot  and  Katarina Östergren:  «Taking  Power  from Knowledge. A 
Theoretical Framework for the Study of Two Public Sector Reforms». December 2003. ATM. 
23‐2003  Per  Lægreid,  Ståle  Opedal  and  Inger  Marie  Stigen:  «The  Norwegian  Hospital  Reform  – 
Balancing Political Control and Enterprise Autonomy». December 2003. ATM. 
24‐2003  Håkon  Høst:  «Kompetansemåling  eller  voksenutdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene? 
Underveisrapport fra en studie av pleie‐ og omsorgsutdanningene». Desember 2003. 
25‐2003  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Odd  Rune  Straume  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «Downstream  merger  with 
upstream market power». The Globalization Program. December 2003. 
26‐2003  Ingrid Drexel: «Two Lectures: The Concept of Competence – an Instrument of Social and 
Political Change». «Centrally Coordinated Decentralization – No Problem? Lessons from the 
Italian Case». December 2003. 
 
2002 
1‐2002  Håkon  Høst:  «Lærlingeordning  eller  skolebasert  utdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene?». 
April 2002. 
2‐2002  Jan‐Kåre  Breivik,  Hilde  Haualand  and  Per  Solvang:  «Rome  –  a  Temporary  Deaf  City! 
Deaflympics 2001». June 2002. 
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3‐2002  Jan‐Kåre Breivik, Hilde Haualand og Per Solvang: «Roma – en midlertidig døv by! Deaflympics 
2001». Juni 2002. 
4‐2002  Christian Madsen: «Spiller det noen rolle? – om hverdagen på nye og gamle sykehjem». Juni 
2002. 
5‐2002  Elin Aasmundrud Mathiesen: «Fritt  sykehusvalg. En  teoretisk  analyse  av konkurranse  i det 
norske sykehusmarkedet». Juni 2002. HEB. 
6‐2002  Tor Helge Holmås: «Keeping Nurses at Work: A Duration Analysis». June 2002. HEB. 
7‐2002  Ingvild Halland Ørnsrud:  «Mål‐  og  resultatstyring  gjennom  statlige  budsjettreformer».  Juli 
2002. 
8‐2002  Torstein Haaland: «Tid, situasjonisme og institusjonell utakt i systemer». Juli 2002. 
9‐2002  Kristin  Strømsnes:  «Samspillet  mellom  frivillig  organisering  og  demokrati:  Teoretiske 
argument og empirisk dokumentasjon». August 2002. 
10‐2002  Marjoleine Hooijkaas Wik:  «Mangfold  eller konformitet? Likheter og  forskjeller  innenfor og 
mellom fem statlige tilknytningsformer». August 2002. 
11‐2002  Knut Helland:«Den opprinnelige symbiosen mellom fotball og presse». September 2002. 
12‐2002  Nina Berven: «National Politics and Global Ideas? Welfare, Work and Legitimacy in Norway 
and the United States». September 2002. The Globalization Program. 
13‐2002  Johannes  Hjellbrekke:  «Globalisering  som  utfordring  til  samfunnsvitskapane».  September 
2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
14‐2002  Atle  Møen:  «Den  globale  produksjonen  av  symbol  og  kunnskap.  Verdsflukt  og 
verdsherredømme». September 2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
15‐2002  Tom Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Complex  Patterns  of  Interaction  and  Influence Among 
Political and Administrative Leaders». October 2002. 
16‐2002  Ivar Bleiklie: «Hierarchy and Specialization. On Institutional Integration of Higher Education 
Systems». Oktober 2002. 
17‐002  Per Lægreid, Runolfur Smari Steinthorsson and Baldur Thorhallsson: «Europeanization of Public 
Administration:  Effects  of  the  EU  on  the  Central  Administration  in  the  Nordic  States». 
November 2002. 
18‐2002  Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid: «Trust in Government — the Relative Importance of Service 
Satisfaction, Political Factors and Demography». November 2002. 
19‐2002  Marit  Tjomsland:  «Arbeidsinnvandringssituasjonen  i  Norge  etter  1975».  November  2002. 
Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
20‐2002  Augustín José Menéndez m.fl.: «Taxing Europe. The Case for European Taxes in Federal 
Perspective». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
21‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Globalization and Risky Human Capital 
Investment».December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
22‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Human Capital Investment and Globalization in 
Extortionary States». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
23‐2002  Anne Lise Fimreite, Yngve Flo og Jacob Aars: «Generalistkommune og oppgavedifferensiering. 
Tre innlegg». Desember 2002.  
24‐2002  Knut Grove: «Frå privat initiativ til kommunalt monopol. Lysverk, sporvegar og renovasjon i 
Bergen og Oslo 1850–1935». Desember 2002. 
25‐2002  Knut Grove: «Mellom ʹnon‐interventionʹ og ʹsamfundsvillieʹ. Statleg og kommunal regulering 
av økonomisk verksemd i Norge på 1800‐talet». Desember 2002. 
26‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen: «Hovedtyper av valgordninger. Proporsjonalitet eller politisk 
styring?». Desember 2002. 
27‐2002  Jan Erik Askildsen, Badi H. Baltagi and Tor Helge Holmås: «Will Increased Wages Reduce 
Shortage of Nurses? A Panel Data Analysis f Nursesʹ Labour Supply». December 2002. HEB. 
28‐2002  Sturla Gjesdal, Peder R. Ringdal, Kjell Haug and John Gunnar Mæland: «Medical Predictors of 
Disability Pension in Long‐Term Sickness Absence. December 2002. HEB. 
29‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen og Jacob Aars: «Teknologi og demokrati. Med norske kommuner på 
nett!». Desember 2002. 
30‐2002  Jacob Aars: «Byfolk og politikk. Gjennomgang av data fra en befolkningsundersøkelse i 
Bergen, Oslo og Tromsø». Desember 2002. 
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31‐2002  Hjørdis Grove: «Kommunaliseringsprosessen i Århus 1850–1940». Desember 2002. 
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